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Abstract: This paper proposes a new method for generating symmetric keys. The keys are based on a co-operative key
simulation model with participation from the sender and receiver. Since this method uses a secret key, it enjoys the
benefits of the private key cryptography, using two 64-bit keys in parallel for generating a single 128-bit temporary key.
The efficiency of the algorithm is proved on a mathematical basis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of cryptography dates back to Caesarian era,
when Julius Caesar used a crude system of
encryption to send orders to his generals. It involved
shifting the letters, a predetermined number of
characters. As encryption evolved, several
sophisticated transformations were used. Documents
can be encrypted using transformation key which
again used to decrypt the document, referred to as a
symmetric key system. The public-key encryption
system was introduced in the late 1970s. Two keys
are involved in the process of encryption, one is kept
private, and the other is made public. Unfortunately,
public-key algorithms are relatively slow, ideal for
encrypting small amount of information! Data
integrity assurance and data origin-authentication are
essential security services in network transactions, e-
commerce and data storage. The broadest definition
of authentication within computing systems includes
identity verification, message authentication and
content authentication [5].  By the use of private key,
attackers could not generate messages offline since
they don’t know the secret key [3]. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 presents
implementation of the CKE, Section 3 describes
Security Limitations of key based recovery and
Section 4 the security of the proposed method is
analyzed.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF CO-OPERATIVE
KEY ENCRYPTION (CKE)
Co-operative Key Encryption is a block cipher. It is a
well-engineered algorithm with a powerful influence
on cryptography, where both the sender and receiver
use a Co-operative key known only to them. Sender
and Receiver agree on two numbers “p” and “g” ,
where p is a large prime number and g the base
generator. Sender then chooses his secret even
number called “a”. Similarly the Receiver’s secret
even number is “b”. Sender and Receiver exchange
their numbers. Sender knows p, g, a, b and the
Receiver knows p, g, b, a. The sender Computes the
Key for Encryption as k1a = g a mod p and k2a = g bmod p. The key is generated in 128 bits as its key
length. k1a forms the first part of the Symmetric key.k2b second part of the encryption key .i.e. Key K =k1a & k2b . as demonstrated in Fig. 1. The Key isthen used to encrypt the data blocks of 128 bytes and
sent. encrypts and Send the Data. The receiver
Computes the Key for Decryption as k1a = g a mod pand k2b = g b mod p. The message is then rotatedleft a x b times to create the cipher text. Key K = k1a& k2b . and rotate right a x b times decrypts thedata.
Fig. 1.  128 bit Encryption key
A. Implementation of CKE
Let K1a,K2b be 64-bit CKE keys and let M be a 128-bit plaintext such that K= K1a&&K2b
Let CKE(K1a && K2b,M) = CKE(K1a,M) &&CKE(K2b,M)
This defines a block cipher CKE: {0, 1}128 × {0,
1}128 → {0, 1}.
It has a 128-bit key, viewed as consisting of two 64-
bit CKE keys.
Note that it is reversible, as required to be a block
cipher:
CKE−1(K1a && K2b,C) = CKE−1(K1a,C) &&CKE−1(K2b,C) .for any 128-bit C.
64 bit key of Sender 64 bit key of Receiver
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B. CKE Encryption Algorithm
Algorithm EK(M)
M[1] M[m] ← M
for i = 1, . . . ,m do
C[i] ← EK(M[i]⊕ k[i])C[i] ← RAL(C[i])ab
return C
C. CKE -1 Decryption Algorithm
Algorithm DK(C)
C[0] C[m] ← C
for i = 1, . . . ,m do
M[i] ← E−1 (C[i])⊕ K[i])
M[i] ← RAR(M[i]) ab
return M
Fig.2. The 128 bit Encryption and Decryption
Algorithms
Since the key length  128 is large, it is difficult to
trace the key in exhaustive key searches. CKE is also
secure against known cryptanalytic techniques,
namely differential and linear cryptanalysis, Though
CKE has a key-length  128, it turns out that it can be
broken into two 64 bit keys. Though CKE and CKE−1
are not secure against linear  differential
cryptanalysis, these attacks are impractical. The
effective key length of CKE is large enough for
security.
III. SECURITY LIMITATIONS OF KEY
BASED RECOVERY.
The security of block ciphers is directly dependent on
key recovery. The analysis of a block cipher E is
based on answers to a set of questions. Given a
number q of input outputs the encrypted information
as (M1,C1), . . . , (Mq,Cq),
Ci = ET (Mi) where T is a random number
A block cipher is “secure” if key-recovery attacks
are computationally infeasible. This translates to a
value q or a running time t that is too large to make
the attack practical. Security against key-recovery is
quite limited. A strong key can guarantee security on
the block cipher. Consider
C = EK(M) as an “encryption” of plaintext M underkey K.
An intruder having the value of C but not knowing K,
should find it computationally infeasible to recover
M, or even some part of M. Security against key-
recovery is a certain necessity. If the attacker could
find K, he could certainly compute M, via M = E−1 K(M). But security against key-recovery is not
sufficient to ensure that M cannot be recovered given
K alone. Again consider the block cipher
E: {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}128 → {0, 1}128 defined by
EK(M) = CKE(M[1]) & M[2] where M[1] is the first64 bits of M and M[2] is the last 64 bits of M. Key
recovery is as hard in CKE. Security against key-
recovery alone does not make a “good” block cipher.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security keys are determined by the key size of
their outputs, n. The method discussed in this paper
has the same attack complexity, but the permutation
process increases the attack complexity in proportion
to the size of the secret key. Since a 128-bit secret
key is used, permutation complexity incomplete
yields the total complexity of 2!27! × 2128and is
secure.
Let K1a && K2b denote the target key and let C1 =CKE(K1a&& K2b,M1).
The attacker, given M1,C1, is attempting to find K1a&& K2b.
It can be observed that
C1 = CKE(K2b,CKE(K1a,M1)) ⇒ CKE−1(K2b,C1) =CKE(K1a,M1) .
leads to the following attack. Below,
for i = 1, . . . , 2128, let Ti denote the
i-th 128-bit string:
MinM2CKE(M1,C1)
for i = 1, . . . , 2128 do L[i] ← CKE(Ti,M1)for j = 1, . . . , 2128 do R[j] ← CKE−1(Tj ,C1)S ← { (i, j) : L[i] = R[j] }
Pick some (l, r) ∈ S and return Tl || Tr
For any (i, j) ∈ S
CKE(Ti,M1) = L[i] = R[j] = CKE−1(Tj ,C1)
and as a consequence CKE(Tj ,CKE(Ti,M1)) = C1.
So the key Ti k Tj is consistent with the input-output
example (M1,C1). Thus,
{ Tl k Tr : (l, r) ∈ S } = ConsE((M1,C1)) .
The attack picks some pair (l, r) from S and outputs
Tl || Tr, thus returning a key consistent with the input-
output example (M1,C1). The set S above is likely to
be quite large, of size about 264+64/264 = 264, means the
attack is not likely to return the target key. Trying a
few more input-output examples, it is easy to jot
down the choices in the set S until it is likely that
only the target key remains. The attack makes 264 +
264 = 263 CKE or CKE−1 computations. The step offorming the set S can be implemented in linear time
in the size of the arrays involved. Thus the running
time is dominated by the CKE, CKE−1 computations.
The meet-in-the-middle attack shows that CKE is
quite far from a cipher where the best attack is
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exhaustive key search. Since this attack is
impractical, even with the best of the machines. The
machines can do the computations quickly, but to
form the set the attack needs to store the arrays L,R,
each of which has 128 entries, each entry being 128
bits. The amount of storage required is 16 ・ 2128 ≈
results in  terabytes, which is so large, that
implementing the attack is impractical. Since a 128-
bit CKE key can be found using 2128 CKE or CKE−1
computations, implies CKE has an effective key
length of 128.
Let E: K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher.
Operating it in CKE yields a stateful symmetric
encryption scheme, SE = (K, E,D). The key
generation algorithm returns a 128 bit key for the
block cipher. The encryption and decryption
algorithms are depicted in Fig. 2.The encryption
procedure is parallelizable and can be exploited to
speed up the process in the presence of hardware
support. The methods work for strings of arbitrary bit
lengths.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper has demonstrated a new method of
encryption and decryption using a Mathematical
Technique. This technique is useful for the
refinement of the cipher text to increase the
complexity to produce the better cipher text. The
refinement process may be continued to give next
better cipher text. As the method is depending on
multiple symmetric keys which has found by a newer
mathematical algorithm and to the best of our
knowledge it would be difficult to attackers for
cryptanalysis.
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